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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN THE REAL PROPERTY CONTEXT: 
AN UPDATE 
by Lynda Butler" and Matthew Klepper"" 
Covenants which restrict the use of land for the purpose of protecting against competition 
have been consistently enforced by Virginia courts so long as the covenants are reasonable, not 
contrary to public policy, not in restraint of trade and not for the purpose of creating a 
monopoly.1 Restrictive covenants of any type are strictly construed due to the strong policy 
reasons supporting the unrestricted use of land.2 Drafting an enforceable restrictive covenant is 
generally of little value, however, unless the covenant can be enforced against subsequent 
purchasers of the property. Although Virginia courts traditionally have refused to enforce 
noncompetition covenants as real covenants against successors to the burdened land by a 
judgment for damages at law/ the courts have allowed enforcement by injunction in equity 
under the doctrine of equitable servitudes." 
The doctrine of equitable servitudes was first described in the famous English case of Tulk 
v. Moxhay.s In that case the court ruled that equity would enforce an agreement to use or 
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IHercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935, 939 (1955) (covenant not to engage in 
manufacture of pulp on conveyed property upheld in equity). 
2Foods First, Inc. v. Gables Associates, 244 Va. 180 (1992) (restrictive covenant prevented lessor from 
erecting supermarket larger than lessee's). 
3REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 3.6 emt. a (Tentative Draft No.2, 1991). The 
courts apparently reasoned that covenants not to compete could not meet the touch and concern 
requirement. See, e.g., Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (1886) (building restriction held not to run with the 
land because the benefit did not touch and concern). A restrictive covenant runs with the land--and 
therefore benefits or burdens a subsequent owner of the land--when the covenant involves an enforceable 
promise, the parties intend for the covenant to run and bind successors in interest, the covenant touches 
and concerns the land, and privity of estate exists between the covenanting parties. See Net Realty 
Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 759, 762 (E.D. Va. 1982). See generally 20 AM. 
lUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 1, 2 (1982); 21 CJ.S. Covenants § 25 (1990). 
4 See, e.g., Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605 (1955) (covenant not to use land as a movie theater upheld 
in equity). 
~ Phil. 774 (ell. 1848). 
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abstain from using land in a particular way or manner against any purchaser or possessor with 
notice regardless of whether the agreement created a valid covenant running with the land at law. 
Early on, the Virginia courts applied the doctrine of equitable servitudes to noncompetition 
agreements, enforcing the burden6 of competition restrictions in equity against aU purchasers 
with notice.' In Oliver v. Hewitt,8 the court upheld a covenant restricting the sale of groceries 
and soft drinks on conveyed land and cited with approval the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay. The 
earlier holding of the court in Tardy v. Creasy,9 which exemplified the traditional disfavor of 
noncompetition covenants in the law, was distinguished by an exceptionally narrow reading. 
Relief was denied in Tardy, according to the court in Oliver, "primarily upon the ground that the 
restrictive covenant was illegal and unenforceable because it constituted a general restraint of 
trade." lO 
The most troubling question about noncompetition coven~ts facing Virginia courts during 
the first part of this century was whether the benefit of a competition" restriction could be 
enforced in equity by a subsequent purchaser. l1 The Virginia Supreme Court, in Hercules 
Powder Co. v. Continental Can CO.,12 held that the benefit may pass to subsequent purchasers 
when there is proof that the parties intended the benefit to attach to the land in equity. The 
Hercules court articulated a standard for when the benefit would pass to successors in interest 
which revolved solely around intent: 'llthe intention of the parties [is] the " criterion of the 
existence of the right. .. .'"13 This standard was important because it failed to mention the 
touch and concern requirement that was a traditional element of both real covenants and equitable 
servitudes. Although the touch and concern requirement presented a serious obstacle to 
'The promisee's rights and entitlements are known as the "benefit," while the promisor's duties are 
known as the "burden." See RICHARD POWEu., nIB l...Aw OF REAL PROPERTY § 673[2] n.3O (P. Rohan 
rev. ed. 199O). 
7 See Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. 163 (1950) (covenant not to sell groceries on conveyed land enforced 
in equity). 
8Id. 
981 Va. 553 (1886). 
10 Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. at 169-70 (quoting Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. at 561-62 (1886». 
11 J.S.W., Jr., Private Land Use Restrictions in Virginia, 49 VA. L REv. 1047, 1065 (1963). 
12 196 Va. 935 (1955). 
13 Id. at 947 (quoting Clleatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 39 (1927». 
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enforcement of noncompetition covenants at law,I4 the requirement was generally of little 
consequence in equitable servitude cases. IS As one commentator explained, 
Equitable servitudes invariably involve negative covenants-promises with 
respect to how land should not be used. Such promises clearly do touch 
and concern the land, so the courts of equity, for the most part, have not 
stated nor found it necessary to state touch and concern as a separate 
requirement.16 
Virginia courts appear to have ignored the touch and concern requirement in evaluating the 
enforceability of noncompetition covenants in equity, and seem to have followed the suggestion 
of many commentators I7 to focus squarely on the public policy issues involved. IS Focusing 
on the public policy issues allows the courts to avoid artificial manipulations of the already 
difficult touch and concern test and thus minimizes further frustration of the expectations of 
lawyers and their clients. 
In evaluating noncompetition clauses in the real covenant context, at least one court has 
substituted a "reasonableness" test for the traditional touch and concern requirement as its pivotal 
inquiry.I9 The court in Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc. explained that courts today 
recognize that "parties in commercial-property transactions" may need "to protect themselves 
from competition by executing noncompetition covenants,,;20 without the covenants, the parties 
may hesitate to invest substantial sums in the property. "A 'reasonableness' test allows a court 
to consider the enforceability of a covenant in view of the realities of today's commercial world 
and not in the light of out-moded theories developed in a vastly different commercial 
environment. ,,21 
U· . See DaVidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 292-93 (1990). 
IS See, e.g., Mid-State Equipment Co., Inc. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 141 (1976). 
16 Lawrence Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 
43 WASH. & LEE L REv. 337, 362 (1986). 
17 See, e.g., GERAlD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE l....AND USE ARRANGEMENTS 315-16 (1990); Paula A. 
Franzese, flOut of Touch:" The Diminished Viability of the Touch and Concern Requirement in the Law 
of Servitudes, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 235, 243 (1991). 
18 See Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605 (1955). 
19 Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 292-93 (1990). 
20 Id. at 295. 
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In defining its reasonableness test, the court in Davidson borrowed from an analogous 
standard used to determine the validity of employment noncompetition covenants. This standard 
allows enforcement of an employee noncompetition covenant if it "protects the legitimate interest 
of the employer" without imposing "undue hardship" on the employee and "is not injurious to 
the public."22 Touch and concern considerations played only a mall role in the court's 
development of "reasonableness" factors.23 According to the court, "[a]spects of the 'touch and 
concern' test. .. remain useful in evaluating the reasonableness of a covenant" by helping to 
distinguish between promises that were intended to affect the use and value of the land and bind 
subsequent owners and those that were intended to be personal to the covenanting parties only.24 
The court then rejected a narrow approach to determining whether the use and value of land were 
benefitted by a noncompetition covenant. The appropriate benchmark was not the size of the 
burdened property relative to the market area, but rather the lessening of competition in the 
market area.25 Furthermore, this benchmark was but one of many factors to consider in 
evaluating the reasonableness of the covenant. 26 
22 Id. at 296. For a discussion of Virginia's approach to employment noncompetition covenants, see 
the article by Robert Billingsley, which appears next in the Fee Simple. 
23 Strangely, the court neglected to mention the touch and concern test when listing the reasonableness 
factors. This omission could be interpreted as evidence that the court did in fact abandon the touch and 
concern test, despite the court's assertion to the contrary. More likely, however, the touch and concern 
element is implied in one of the flrst two factors listed by the court ("intention[s] of the parties" and 
"considerations exchanged"). See FRANZESE, supra note 17, at 251. 
7A Davidson, 579 A.2d at 296. 
2S Id. at 297. 
216 Factors listed by the court in Davidson include: 
1. The intention of the parties when the covenant was executed, and 
whether the parties had a viable purpose which did not at the time 
interfere with existing commercial laws, such as antitrust laws, or public 
policy. 2. Whether the covenant had an impact on the considerations 
exchanged when the covenant was originally executed. This may provide 
. a measure of the value to the parties of the covenant at the time. 3. 
Whether the covenant clearly and expressly sets forth the restrictions. 4. 
Whether the covenant was .in writing, recorded, and if so, whether the 
subsequent grantee had actual notice of the covenant. 5. Whether the 
covenant is reasonable concerning area, time or duration. Covenants that 
extend for perpetuity or beyond the terms of a lease may often be 
unreasonable. 6. Whether the covenant imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on trade or secures a monopoly for the covenantor. This may 
be the case in areas where there is limited space available to conduct 
certain business activities and a covenant not to compete burdens all or 
most available locales to prevent them from competing in such an 
38 
The court in Davidson was clearly attempting to free the policies behind the touch and 
concern requirement from the technical rules that governed application of the requirement. 
Although numerous commentators have posited opinions on the proper interpretation of the touch 
and concern test, rT one of the most sensible statements of the test focuses on the reasonable 
expectations of the ordinary purchaser.28 This analysis asks whether the reasonable layman 
would expect the promise to be personal, tied up with the land, or both.29 Any analytical tool, 
including the complicated reasonableness formula posited by the court in Davidson--which 
successfully realizes the policy goals underlying the touch and concern test while pulling back 
the mysterious shroud of the touch and concern test-serves a valuable function in defining why 
some sort of limitation on restrictive covenants is necessary. Analysis which is directed at 
effectuation of the policy goals of the traditional touch and concern test, whether it be the 
ordinary purchaser test or a complicated reasonableness formula, applies equally well in the 
equitable servitudes context as in the real covenant area. 
Virginia's courts have steadfastly resisted the use of real covenant law in evaluating the 
enforceability of noncompetition covenants against subsequent purchasers. The only case in the 
recent past which has even mentioned the requirements of a real covenant while evaluating a 
noncompetition agreement was Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, inc.,30 a 
federal case applying Virginia state law. Simply stated, noncompetition covenants are generally 
valid when reasonable and are enforceable in equity against subsequent purchasers with notice 
of the agreement when the parties intended the agreement to bind successors in title. Both 
benefits and burdens of noncompetition covenants may pass to subsequent purchasers with notice 
when the intent requirement is satisfied.31 Virginia law today has taken an important step 
towards a principled reconciliation of the competing policies implicated by noncompetition 
covenants. The importance of allowing free alienability of land while still respecting the ability 
of private parties to meaningfully contract regarding the future use of land is recognized by 
Virginia law, which focuses clearly on the intent of the contracting parties, the fairness of 
Id. at 295. 
activity. 7. Whether the covenant interferes with the public interest. 8. 
Whether, even if the covenant was reasonable at the time it was executed, 
"changed circumstances" now make the covenant unreasonable. 
Z7 See, e.g., CHARLEs a...AR.K, REAL COVENANTS AND OTIIER INTEREsrs WI-DCH RUN Wrrn TIlE l..AND 
(2d ed. 1947); Bigelow, The Content of Covenants. in Leases, 12 MICH. L REV. 639 (1914). 
1I.See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L REV. 
167 (1970). 
29 Id. at 211. 
30 544 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
31 Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935 (1955). 
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enforcement by and against subsequent purchasers, and the protection of the public interest. The 
next step for the Virginia courts is to consider the possibility of making a clean break with the 
past and focusing directly on the public policy considerations of enforcing noncompetition 
agreements against subsequent purchasers--perhaps even without regard for the original parties' 
intent.32 
321be draft Restatement (Third) of Property makes significant breaks with traditional servitudes law 
in at least two instances. First, the Restatement combines easements, profits, real covenants, equitable 
servitudes, and irrevocable licenses into the primary category of servitudes. The draft presents servitude 
law as an integrated body of rules and principles. The drafters explain that, except in a few instances, "all 
the servitude devices are functionally similar." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERlY (SERvrnJDES) 
introduction at xxiii (Tentative Draft No.1, 1989). Second, the Restatement proposes the elimination of 
the horizontal privity of estate requirement and the touch and concern requirement from servitudes law. 
Id. § 2.4.; id. § 3.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991). 
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